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#MeToo is little more than mob rule // vs // #MeToo is a legitimate form of social justice 
 
An Introduction to the Shortcut: #MeToo: Legal quandaries, public shaming, and the 
violence of silence". 
 
Abstract 
This “Shortcuts” section engages the debate on whether the #MeToo movement is 
best understood as a form of social justice, bringing heinous acts often shrouded in decades 
of silence into the public domain, or as mob rule, foregoing official legal channels to 
summarily shame individuals through unmoderated character-assassination. The four 
contributors offer diverse views on the efficacy of the #MeToo movement to bring forth 
structural change. They consider the relationship between #MeToo and other longer-running 
civil rights initiatives, the role of new communication technologies in producing collective 
suffering, the need to better contextualize the production of shame, they address questions of 
how love and desire might fit into twenty-first century bio-politics, and critically assess the 
relationship between hashtag movements and institutionalized law. 
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The #MeToo movement that has spread rapidly since October 2017 has helped publicize the 
widespread prevalence of sexual assault, harassment, and gender inequality in the workplace. 
Following the allegations of sexual misconduct aimed at Hollywood producer Harvey 
Weinstein, thousands of women took to social media in solidarity with the victims and to 
share their own stories of harassment, assault, and rape. The #MeToo movement provided a 
platform for women to break what in some cases was decades of silence. Then, arguably, 
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#MeToo started to spin out of control as it became clear that the boundaries of appropriate 
sexual behavior were a subjective matter. When and how might it be appropriate for a man to 
proposition a woman? Should questionable sexual conduct be understood within precise 
cultural and historical contexts, or is it universally (spatially and temporally) deplorable? 
Should cases of suspected wrongdoing be left in the hands of official law enforcement rather 
than aired publicly through social media shaming? And what happens when the perpetrator is 
a woman and a feminist? 
In January 2018, French actress Catherine Deneuve was among 100 women who 
signed an open letter denouncing the #MeToo movement and women’s right to publicly call 
out suspected perpetrators of sexual violence. It was, she inferred, a witch hunt against the 
right of a man to make a sexual proposition. The letter stated, “Men have been punished 
summarily, forced out of their jobs when all they did was touch someone’s knee or try to 
steal a kiss.” In an interview with Agence France Presse news agency, Monty Python star 
Terry Gilliam compared #MeToo to “mob rule” that created a “world of victims.” Such 
comments provoked an angry backlash from high-profile personas such as actress Asia 
Argento, who claims she was assaulted by Weinstein in the 1990s (Argento has herself since 
become the subject of a sexual assault accusation made by a 17-year-old actor and musician). 
Public figures like Argento and director Judd Apatow believe that both Deneuve’s letter and 
Gilliam’s comments trivialize sexual violence, endorse a culture of “victim blaming,” and 
belittle #MeToo as a platform for democratizing feminism where victims can share their 
experiences. 
The aporia surrounding the objectives of the en masse “trial by media,” which some 
may argue #MeToo has become, has been discussed by Dubravka Zarkov and Kathy Davis in 
their article “Ambiguities and dilemmas around #MeToo: #ForHow Long and #WhereTo?” 
(2018). The authors appear aporetic in regard to the scope of the #MeToo movement and 
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their own feelings about what has gained public traction as “the new feminism.” Having 
engaged in long-term research on violence against women, the authors express a sense of 
clarity, comfort, and solidarity to be found back in the feminist ideology of the 1970s when 
acts of speaking out were clearly “an active defiance and resistance to the patriarchal 
prescription of silence and shame” (2018: 4). The waters of the new feminism are somewhat 
murkier, with the emergent era of “trial by media” generating a multitude of potential 
problems, not least shifting the focus away from the act of violence to individual character 
assassinations and profuse publicity for both victim and offender. 
In this Shortcuts section, our contributors have been asked to address these opposing 
stances: On the one hand, #MeToo is little more than mob rule premised on vigilantism that 
foregoes judicial procedure in favor of public shaming. In doing so, it shifts the spotlight 
away from the crime and onto the individual character of perpetrator and victim, thus failing 
to tackle the structural problem of sexual violence. On the other hand, #MeToo provides a 
form of social justice that allows the sharing of taboo issues and helps break the silence 
surrounding serious crimes that can then be dealt with through official legal channels. 
The #MeToo trials forgo (and at times seem to replace) jurisprudence, falling into the 
complicated territory of punitive public shaming found in places as diverse as the 1960s 
Mediterranean, South Asia, the war-torn Congo, and Bronisław Malinowski’s Melanesia. 
Regardless of intention, #MeToo has given rise to a superficial, short-lived rearrangement of 
justice through an unprecedented deployment of shaming and publicity that do not address 
the structural problem of sexual misconduct. As Judith Butler recently put it, the media has 
become the new public tribunal where “whoever speaks is assumed to speak the truth” 
(quoted in Gessen 2018). It seems that public shaming feeds a sense of restorative justice 
where the consequences of negative publicity—on career, family life, corporate 
endorsements—stands in for the judicial process. This process belays a general distrust in the 
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expected efficacy of the law and reminds one of shaming practices well-documented in the 
ethnographic archive—cutting hair, stripping away clothes, bodily mutilation, sexual assault 
as the result of vendetta or witchcraft accusations. Does trial by media equate to shaming as 
jurisprudence, and if so, does this differ from cases of shaming found in the classic 
ethnographies of the Mediterranean or Malinowski’s ideas on primitive law? Can public 
scandals fashioned on social media platforms effect structural change in core public 
institutions of governance? 
In the work of Mediterraneanists John Campbell (1964), John Peristiany (1965), and 
Julian Pitt-Rivers (1965)—later revised by scholars including Michael Herzfeld (1980) and 
Jill Dubisch (1995), among many others—“honor and shame” is one of the most enduring 
models to explicate the relationship between individual and communal morality. The shamed 
individual can contaminate their family and community, stigmatizing successive generations, 
leading to social, economic, and political ostracization and ruination. The act of shaming 
often takes place in the public domain, the news traveling through social networks by way of 
gossip, rumor, or publicity. By the same token, lost reputations can be repaired through 
careful manipulation of public opinion (Fazio 1999, in Busatta 2006). Targeted at 
undermining reputation, shaming frequently serves the traditional functions of criminal law. 
It is true that shaming can discourage potential offenders, but it can also have wholly 
undesirable effects that lead to escalating violence and vendettas. 
In Crime and custom in savage society, Malinowski (1926) also recognizes publicity 
as a vessel for a certain form of law. In his view, civil law consists of “a body of binding 
obligations, regarded as a right by one party and acknowledged as a duty by the other, kept in 
force by a mechanism of reciprocity and publicity inherent in the structure of their society” 
(1926: 58). Public expostulation may not be “exclusively legal,” he continues, and the “main 
province of law is in the social mechanism” (1926: 60–61). Publicity can test the waters of 
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community interest in a case of potential wrongdoing, but it is only when transactions (the 
claims of prosecution and defense) have come to be consummated according to special forms 
(the official judicial process) that they may be said to be on their way to legal recognition. 
Malinowski adds that quarrels regularly take the form of public postulation in which parties 
of friends and relatives harangue one another, hurling recrimination. These occasions allow 
people to vent their frustrations and attempt to shape public opinion. But rarely, Malinowski 
maintains, do these acts result in “definite sentences.” The public expression of sentiment 
does not usually lead to structural change (1926: 60). 
#MeToo certainly brought much-needed public attention to the matter of violence 
against women. But the publicity generated by #MeToo placed attention on individuals as 
harbingers of fetishized evil rather than helping tackle the structural problems found at the 
heart of institutions as diverse as broadcasting corporations, city firms, universities, and in 
the publishing industry. Feminists have long argued that we need to “redefine in fundamental 
ways the accepted historical categories and to make visible hidden structures of domination 
and exploitation” (Federici 2014: 13). It is only through a synergetic examination of the 
sources where power inequalities are produced, cultivated, and sustained that we could 
possibly entertain hope of breaking a circle of violence against women. 
Media platforms can “materially mold a subject and a culture of perception” 
(Feldman 1994: 406). In cases of violence against women, the productivity of public shaming 
and the seemingly fundamental role of social movements in the new feminism should be 
problematized. It is possible that hyperbole in a media domain swamped with claims and 
counterclaims—in a form of routinized violence (Feldman 1991: 229)—could breed apathy 
toward the cause. #MeToo could be construed as a vigilante movement dealing in publicity 
and shame, summarily and indiscriminately lynching the accused without fair trial. If so, to 
what extent can #MeToo really provide a platform for legitimate social justice? In engaging 
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with this question, contributors will consider how public shaming can or cannot lead to 
sustainable change at institutions that habitually permit and naturalize harassment, violation, 
or abuse. Further, does the focus of the #MeToo movement on individual characters through 
public shaming replace the role of jurisprudence, deflecting attention away from both the 
violent act and the legal process? The authors of this Shortcuts section explore #MeToo in 
relation to jurisprudence, maintaining that only by considering the relationship between 
shaming in its context of production, publicity in new communication technologies, long-
running civil rights initiatives, institutionalized law, and human desires can we begin to better 
evaluate the efficacy of embryonic social movements that advocate community-orientated 
quick-fire justice. 
In her Shortcut, Micaela di Leonardo argues that #MeToo is not nearly enough. She 
advocates that #MeToo offers an opportunity to foreground women’s stories that are often all 
too readily swept under the corporate carpet. However, she maintains that the social 
movement requires clearer definition and direction and would benefit from incorporating 
some of the shared theoretical grounding found in 1970s feminism. With this new impetus, 
#MeToo could then be more fruitfully discussed alongside other social justice movements 
against racism, xenophobia, homophobia, class discrimination, and violence. #MeToo is 
categorically not “mob rule”—rather than relying on legal remedies alone, every possible 
form of activist organizing must be mobilized to combat widespread sexual violence. Di 
Leonardo concludes that #MeToo is a form of social justice, a promising start that really 
should go further. 
Brackette Williams and Drexel Woodson share di Leonardo’s views on the need for 
better engagement with other longer-standing civil movements; however, they suggest that 
#MeToo is too young to even be called a social movement. Although undoubtedly a good 
cause, their worry is that the publicity surrounding #MeToo detracts from other more 
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established initiatives for social justice, such as race equality and children’s rights. Williams 
and Woodson question the productivity of creating yet another set of essentialized “Ultra-
Others,” of stereotyped enemies against whom to juxtapose a global community of suffering. 
They further doubt the ability for virtual hashtag websites to transform righteous indignation 
and a strong verbal commitment to change into a mechanism to tackle the root causes of 
sexual transactionalism. #MeToo is a step toward justice for many victims of sexual 
misconduct, but it remains to be seen whether the movement will be sustainable over the long 
term or if it will be a catalyst for institutional change. 
Thomas Hylland Eriksen focuses on the new communication technologies that have 
provided a global—and relatively unmoderated—platform for the #MeToo boom. Using 
social media to spread allegations about sexual misconduct through indefinitely scaled 
electronic networks creates a hitherto unknown, and slightly anarchic, communication 
regime. On the face of it, global connectivity allowing the sharing of similar stories is a 
positive move, but Eriksen reminds us that what is communicated via social media is often 
not mediated in any way, leading to “mob” mentalities, witch hunts, and victimization in 
some cases. Away from #MeToo, public shaming on social media is widespread, sometimes 
unjustified, and can have disastrous consequences for the accused. He addresses the shaky 
legal ground to #MeToo claims and concludes that, if pushed, he would come down on the 
side of #MeToo as mob rule. 
The fear of mob justice is a theme taken up by Franco La Cecla who suggests that—
akin to the Ultra-Othering discussed by Williams and Woodson—men are readily being 
victimized without due process. He insists that we look deeper into the social and historical 
complexities of love and sex, romantic desire, innocence, and suffering, before signing up to 
wholesale stereotyping. La Cecla projects into the future to ask where this might be leading—
perhaps toward the criminalization of sex and the removal of desire from relationships. He 
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also echoes Eriksen in his belief that new communication technologies are changing the rules 
of the game of the politics of desire. In the age of the omniscient, omnipotent Big Brother, he 
concludes that a by-product of the #MeToo movement is a new voyeurism, as if personal 
intimacy were subject to universal eavesdropping. More than a battle of new feminism, he 
argues, #MeToo is part of a wider twenty-first-century biopolitical power war. 
The contributors to this Shortcuts section offer diverse perspectives on #MeToo as 
social justice verses mob rule. However, on whichever side of the argument they choose to 
lay their hat, there is remarkable common ground. All contributors acknowledge, for 
instance, the unhelpful role of stereotyping, of creating an essentialized other. This practice 
only creates bitterness, a feeling that all those who share an identity trait should be viewed as 
potential perpetrators, leading to a growing sense of victimization. They are not quite in 
agreement, however, as to whether this is a price worth paying for the unearthing of serious 
sexual misconduct and a world of real victims suffering in silence. 
All also agree that new communication technologies can be unreliable for gauging the 
potential to enforce real institutional change. It remains to be seen whether such a well-
publicized social movement as #MeToo will even be able to carry its momentum from the 
online ether to the streets and on into the halls (and heads) of government. One only has to 
consider the unprecedented global publicity of the Occupy movement and its eventual (lack 
of) real-world achievements (and limited life span in the public eye) to realize that #MeToo 
still has a long way to go to become a world-changer. On this point, these authors agree that 
#MeToo should be in closer dialogue with existing long-term social justice movements in 
order to pool resources, better contextualize large-scale social problems, and begin to 
mobilize toward real-world change. 
To these key points, I would add that in addition to focusing on the shame that might 
be brought upon the publicly accused, it is essential to consider the shame cultivated by those 
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who remain in silence. In my own research with children displaced as a consequence of 
floods and landslides in 1950s Calabria, I have witnessed the violence of silence. Torn from 
their parents and taken to live in other parts of Italy, many of my research participants have 
remained silent about their traumatic relocation, unable to come to terms with their shame for 
something they cannot answer to or be held responsible for. Over nearly seventy years, 
silences have grown monstrous and engendered the political subjectivities of the displaced. 
Trying to avoid negative publicity is a strategy employed in small-scale communities, 
global corporations, and academic institutions alike, who attempt to cover up heinous acts 
and maintain silence about violent taboos to protect their own interests and reputations. One 
only has to look at the reassessment of historical instances of sexual violence within our own 
discipline to realize the endemic culture of victim-blaming, smokescreens, and 
stonewalling—consider, for instance, the 1931 rape and murder of Ruth Benedict’s student, 
Henrietta Schmerler (Schmerler and Steffen 2018). #MeToo provides a platform where the 
whispering of violent acts can be heard, shared, and gain traction, potentially encouraging 
more victims to come forward. Devoid of what Michel Serres (1995) would call “background 
noise,” #MeToo provides the possibility for whispers to shatter the blanket silence. The 
shared stories are evidence not only of acts of violence but also the violence of silence and 
the political subjectivities it engenders. An easily accessible archive, #MeToo is a collection 
of stories that have slipped through cracks in the history of violence (primarily against 
women). Taking a careful look at this archive helps us interrogate the structural forces that 
were preventing voices from being heard. 
#MeToo essentially offers to victims of sexual violence a recognized platform to 
share their stories. It might not seem ideal that the stories are collated through a hashtag 
movement—with associated problems of moderation and verification—but this does provide 
an open-access archive and a legitimate channel for others to engage with their own 
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harrowing experiences. Silence is the most striking evidence of violence, and if #MeToo 
potentially empowers people to tear down the walls of silence and interrogate archives of 
pain in the pursuit of justice, then this can only be positive. 
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